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PEOPLE AGAINST NUCLEAR ENERGY (PANE) v. NUCLEAR
REGULATOR Y COMMISSION -

THE

COGNIZABILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACTS UNDER NEPA
In People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,' the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA or the Act)2 required the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission) to consider impacts3 upon the "psychological health" of community residents in assessing the environmental consequences of restarting the nuclear power plant facility, Three Mile
Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1). 4 Although the court limited its holding to posttraumatic psychological impacts that are accompanied by physical
manifestations and caused by fears of recurring catastrophe,' PANE
1. 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. April 19, 1983). People Against Nuclear
Energy is composed of Three Mile Island community residents.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976). NEPA was enacted in 1969 to insure that the quality of
the human environment would be considered in federal decisionmaking. Id. § 433 1. As a
procedural mechanism to enforce this objective, NEPA mandates that an Environmental
Impact Statement be prepared by a federal agency that engages in "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(2)(c).
In addition, a federal agency must prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (SEIS) in accordance with the NEPA regulations whenever that agency "makes
substantial changes in the proposed action" or when "[t]here are significant new circumstances." 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9 (c)(l)(i) & (ii) (1981). PANE contended that the regulations
require the NRC to assess whether the psychological stress suffered by the Three Mile Island
community residents created "significant new circumstances" requiring the preparation of
an SEIS.
3. The NEPA regulations define "effects" as including, "[d]irect effects, which are
caused by the action and occur at the same time and place," and "[i]ndirect effects, which
are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still
reasonably foreseeable." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1981). The regulations state that "effects and
impacts as used in these regulations are synonymous." Id. This Note will follow the regulations and use "effects" and "impacts" interchangeably.
4. The Court of Appeals also held that these same allegations were not cognizable
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2282 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)
(AEA). The court based its holding on the AEA's legislative history and on subsequent case
law, both of which indicated that the Act's scope was limited to the physical hazards of
radiation. 678 F.2d at 249-53.
Although Judge Wright, joined by Judge McGowan, authored the majority opinion
on the NEPA issue, Judge McGowan joined Judge Wilkey on the AEA issue to hold
PANE's contentions uncognizable under the AEA. Judge Wright wrote a dissent on the
AEA issue. This Note will address only psychological impacts under NEPA and consequently will not address the AEA issue.
5. 678 F.2d at 229-30. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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extends the scope of NEPA into an area that prior cases have avoided.6
A straightforward recognition of the cognizability of psychological impacts in general, however, would have been more defensible under
NEPA and more easily contained within workable bounds.

While this Note was going to print, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court's
opinion is discussed below in the footnote.7
On March 28, 1979, a nuclear accident occurred at the nuclear
generating station, Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2). TMI-1, which
was shutdown for ordinary, periodic maintenance and refueling, was
forced by the Commission to remain inactive pending a Commission
proceeding to determine whether TMI-1 could be operated safely.
PANE submitted to the Commission two contentions' asserting that
6. Case law dealing with psychological fear excludes all psychological impacts from
NEPA's scope. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
7. Sub nom Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W.
4371 (U.S. April 19, 1983). The Supreme Court held that psychological reactions to risks
created by a federal program are not encompassed within NEPA. Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist stated that because risks are not part of the physical environment, PANE's
psychological harms are not "environmental" for the purposes of the Act. Id. at 4373. The
Court's primary concern in so delimiting the scope of NEPA was efficiency. Id. at 4374.
Although the Court did not exclude psychological impacts entirely under NEPA, its opinion
places in doubt the applicability of psychological effects in all future federal actions under
the Act. But see id at 4375 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In denying PANE's psychological harm allegations, the Court construed the scope of
the human environment too narrowly. NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare an
EIS whenever federal decisionmaking significantly affects the human environment. The
Court's determination that PANE's psychological impact falls outside of the human environment ignores an integral component of human experience by confining NEPA to the
purely physical environment. Neither Congress nor the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) intended such a narrow interpretation of the human environment. See infra notes
28-30, 43 and accompanying text. The TMI-I restart directly impacts upon the psychological well-being of the Three Mile Island residents. Direct impacts on man cannot be separated from effects on the human environment simply because they derive from risks. If
PANE's psychological effect is "significant" it should be considered by the NRC in its decision to restart the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island, regardless of whether that impact
was propagated through a risk. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text. Finally, the
Court's concern with efficiency applies equally to all psychological impacts, and therefore is
not a basis for distinguishing between various psychological effects. Because the regulatory
and statutory scheme addresses that concern, see infra note 100, it does not justify exclusion
of psychological effects from the Act's protection. See infra notes 69-73, 99-107 and accompanying text.
8. People Against Nuclear Energy, Draft Contentions, in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Appendix G
at 115a, sub nom Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W.
4371 (U.S. April 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as People Against Nuclear Energy Draft Contentions]. These Draft Contentions were submitted to the Atomic Safety Licensing Board
pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(b) on October 5, 1979. The Board, in its certification to the
Commission on these issues, determined that psychological stress and community well-being
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NEPA encompasses the psychological reactions of community members to a federal project and therefore requires that the Commission
consider these effects in determining whether to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). 9 PANE's first contention
concerned the "severe psychological distress" caused by the renewed
operation of TMI-1.'° PANE argued that the TMI-2 accident impaired
the health of the Three Mile Island community residents in the form of
"increased anxiety, tension and fear, a sense of helplessness and such
physical disorders as skin rashes, aggravated ulcers, and skeletal and
muscular problems."" PANE alleged that if TMI-1 were operating it
would be a "constant reminder of the terror which they felt during the
accident" and that the residents
consequently would be unable to re12
"trauma."'
their
from
cover
PANE's second contention involved the "severe harm to the stability, cohesiveness and well being of the communities in the vicinity of
the reactor."' 3 PANE asserted that there would be "a loss of confidence and a breakdown of the social and political order," which eventually would "make permanent the damage, trapping the residents in
disintegrating and dying communities and discouraging the influx of
essential growth."' 4
The Commission voted to exclude consideration of psychological
impacts at its evidentiary hearings. PANE appealed the Commission's
decision to the Court of Appeals,' 5 claiming that the Commission's failure to consider psychological effects when determining whether to prepare an SEIS violated the procedural requirements of NEPA.'6
The court held that psychological impacts upon health are cognizable under NEPA. The majority recognized that case law excludes
psychological impacts under the Act,' 7 but distinguished those cases as
dealing with psychological effects that did not affect human health.
Judge Wright concluded that the psychological stress suffered by the
were cognizable under NEPA. In the matter of the Metropolitan Edison Co., I I N.R.C. 297
(1980).
9. See supra note 2.
10. People Against Nuclear Energy Draft Contentions, supra note 8, at 1.
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
15. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the Commission's order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1966) and Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (1962). The
decision not to consider PANE's contentions in the restart proceeding had the procedural
effect of excluding PANE altogether pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.714a(b).
16. 678 F.2d at 223.
17. Id. at 229. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Three Mile Island residents was severe enough to become a psychological "health" effect for the purposes of NEPA. This conclusion was
based upon three grounds: first, the community residents were traumatized by the TMI-2 accident; 8 second, the residents exhibited physical
manifestations resulting from this post-traumatic stress; 9 and third,
these psychological stress effects would be perpetuated and worsened
by fears of recurring catastrophe.2 °
In response to PANE's second contention, the Court of Appeals
found that the damage to surrounding communities caused by the psychological reaction to the TMI-1 restart was a cognizable secondary
impact. 2 1 The majority reasoned that although community stability
has been held cognizable under NEPA,22 it consistently has been
treated as a socioeconomic impact. In accordance with the well-established "socioeconomic effect" rule,23 the majority held that the impact
upon community stability need not be considered by the Commission
18. 678 F.2d at 229-30. PANE repeatedly adverted to the "psychological vulnerability"
of the TMI community residents due to the TMI-2 accident. Brief in Opposition to Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 60, sub non Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. April 19, 1983); People
Against Nuclear Energy Draft Contentions, supra note 8, at 1.
19. 678 F.2d at 229-30.
20. Id. The majority noted that the type of risk involved - nuclear - potentially is
more severe than other types of environmental impacts and therefore should be accorded
different treatment under NEPA. Id. at 229. This notion is supported by the district court in
New York City v. United States Dep't of Transportation, 539 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), appealdocketed, Nos. 82-6094, 82-6200 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 1983). In that case, involving
the transportation of nuclear waste, the court stated that "public apprehension of a serious
accident is substantial, and it predicts that an accident . . . could produce substantial psychological impacts, greater than those resulting from a nonnuclear accident of equivalent
magnitude." Id. at 1273.
21. 678 F.2d at 230-31.
22. See, e.g., Citizens' Committee Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp.
496, 535 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (involving the "potential economic impacts upon the City of Dayton"); Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850, 859,
af9'd, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Neighborhood stability and growth are values which
have been found to be cognizable under NEPA."); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975) (involving "percentage of minority residents" of the neighborhood). But cf. Monarch
Chemical Works v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 657 (D. Neb. 1979) (involving "the impact on
future businesses that might locate on adjacent land").
23. According to the socioeconomic effect rule, such indirect effects are cognizable under
NEPA but nevertheless are not encompassed within the "human environment" and thus do
not trigger an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1981). See, e.g., Image of Greater San Antonio
Texas v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978); Breckenridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th
Cir. 1976). But see, e.g., Jackson County v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1978); City of
Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975). For further analysis of socioeconomic impacts
under NEPA, see generally Comment, Socioeconomic Impacts and the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969, 64 GEo. L.J. 1121 (1976).
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in its threshold analysis of whether to prepare an SEIS. If, however,
the Commission determined that PANE's psychological health effect
warranted the preparation of an SEIS, then the possible deterioration
of the community must be discussed and evaluated in that statement.24
Judge Wilkey, in his dissent, asserted that no psychological impacts are cognizable under NEPA regardless of their severity.25 He
reasoned that because all psychological impacts affect psychological
health to some degree, various psychological effects are indistinguishable, and thus psychological health would be broadened to encompass
all psychological impacts. The dissent concluded that because Congress did not intend the Act to force federal agencies to evaluate such
subjective reactions, Congress did not intend health to encompass psychological health.26
This Note will demonstrate the cognizability of psychological impacts in general under NEPA. First, the Act's expansive environmental
policy supports the inclusion of psychological health and psychological
impacts in general. Second, the majority's cognizability standard,
which only recognizes an extremely limited range of psychological impacts upon humans, is inherently flawed and unsupported by the statute. Third, cases holding psychological fear uncognizable do not
support excluding psychological impacts from NEPA in all circumstances. Finally, the 1979 NEPA regulations, promulgated by the
Council on Environmental Quality, provide an effective means by
which to consider psychological impacts in the NEPA process.
I.

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH UNDER

NEPA

In holding psychological health cognizable under NEPA, the majority relied upon the cognizability of human health effects in general.
The court held that Congress intended that federal agencies consider
psychological health effects because of "the simple fact that effects on
24. 678 F.2d at 230-31. The court also held that the TMI- 1 restart constituted a "major
federal action" for the purposes of NEPA, and therefore required the NRC to comply with
the procedural requirements of NEPA. Judge Wright relied upon the continuing statutory
obligation of federal agencies with respect to ongoing programs to protect the health and
safety of nearby residents. Id.
25. Id. at 239-42.
26. Concerned with the effect of the majority's holding upon future licensing proceedings and the nuclear industry in general, the dissent asserted that licensing decisions would
become constantly subject to claims of psychological fear because of the majority's holding
that the NRC has a "continuing obligation" to comply with NEPA. See supra note 24. The
dissent argued that because only "proposed" actions are subject to NEPA's mandate, an
agency's obligation under NEPA terminates as a project is completed and placed into operation. 678 F.2d at 242-44.
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psychological health are effects on the health of human beings."'" Although the majority did not attempt to support this interpretation of
health either statutorily or judicially, the cognizability of psychological
health nevertheless has support under the Act.
Human health effects clearly are encompassed within the scope of
the human environment as delimited by NEPA's broad environmental
policy.2" NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS when proposing a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
'
Although the statute does not specify the
human environment."29
NEPA's regulations dictate that
environment,"
"human
breadth of the
its intended scope is that of NEPA's environmental policy as embodied
in section 101.30 This policy mandates that the federal government
"use all practical means. . . to foster and promote the general welfare,
[and] to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony."'" Protecting human well-being is
central to NEPA's policy of maintaining a balance between man and
his surroundings. Defining the human environment in terms of
NEPA's policy is crucial because the scope of the human environment
determines the applicability of NEPA's protective mechanism - the
EIS.32 Thus, what must be considered in an EIS is determined by the
policies of NEPA.
Because the term "health" certainly can be understood to include
both physical and psychological well-being, 33 NEPA's statutory language is capable of encompassing both these aspects of human health.
27. Id. at 227-28.
28. NEPA's goals include "assur[ing] for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings" and "attaining the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)(2) & (3) (1976) (emphasis added).
See also Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 927 (D. Or.
1977), ("No subject to be covered by an EIS can be more important than the potential effects
of a federal program upon the health of human beings.").
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976). See supra note 2.
30. The regulations define the human environment "to include the natural and physical
environment and the relationship of people with that environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14
(1981). The CEQ has elaborated on the intended scope of the human environment: "a few
commentators expressed concern that this definition could be limited to the natural and
physical environment. This is not the Council's intention. . . . The full scope of the environment is set out in section 101 of NEPA. Human beings are central to that concept." 43
Fed. Reg. 55,988 (1978).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976).
32. Section 101 of NEPA contains the substantive portions of the Act, while § 102 provides the means for enforcing § 101's policies.
33. [A]lthough an illness may be primarily physical or psychological, it is always a
disorder of the whole person - not just of the lungs or psyche. Fatigue or a bad
cold may lower our tolerance for psychological stress; an emotional upset may
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Furthermore, NEPA's purposes and policies - designed to promote
the "overall welfare and development of man""4 - support this broad
interpretation of health under NEPA. 35 Senator Jackson, who sponsored the bill in Congress, stated that "the purpose of the bill is to lay
the framework for a continuing program of research and study which
will insure that present and future generations of Americans will be
able to live in and enjoy an environment free of hazards to mental and
'
physical well-being. '"6
In addition, the agency responsible for administering NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 37 has construed health effects as the "physical and emotional health . . . of
Americans. ''3 Finally, NEPA's legislative history gives no indication
that health was intended to be limited to physical health for the Act's
purposes. On the contrary, the legislative history clearly demonstrates
a concern for man's psychological well-being,3 9 and thus supports the
inclusion of psychological health under NEPA.
The majority recognized a connection between physical and psychological health under NEPA, but it did not interpret health to encompass all psychological impacts upon humans. Rather, Judge
Wright espoused a cognizability test which limits the consideration of
lower our resistance to physical disease. In short, the individual is a psycho-biological unit in continual interaction with the environment.
J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 267 (5th ed. 1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a) (1976).
35. The statute mandates that the federal government shall use "all practical means and
measures. . . ina manner to foster and promote the general welfare." Id. It further declares a national environmental policy which will "stimulate the health and welfare of man."
Id. See supra note 28.
36. 115 CONG. REC. 3,698 (1969) (emphasis added).
37. The CEQ was established under NEPA in order to assist federal agencies in complying with the Act, and further, to study new trends in the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4342
(1976). The CEQ acted as an advisory board through the first decade of NEPA's existence.
In 1979, the CEQ promulgated new regulations which replaced earlier nonmandatory guidelines. The Supreme Court has held that the interpretation of NEPA in these regulations
must be accorded "substantial deference" by the courts. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.

347, 358 (1979). See generally Comment, The NEP.4 Regulations, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 295, 29698 (1981).
38. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT No.
1, at 16 (1970).
39. A report on NEPA presented to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs discussed the dangers prevalent in the environment, including "disability and death
from diseases induced by environmental factors (for example, cancer, emphysema, and
mental disorders)." 115 CONG. REC. 3,703 (1969) (emphasis added). This report also discussed "physical and psychological discomfort" caused by the present state of the environment. Id. at 3,704 (emphasis added). Senator Jackson also expressed concern with
"conditions within our central cities which result in civil unrest and detract from man's
social and psychological well-being." S. REP.No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969) (emphasis added).

626
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psychological impacts to those impacts that are severe enough to rise to
the level of psychological health effects. The majority defined "psychological health" narrowly as "the medically diagnosed effects of traumatic accidents on the human mind."' Although the court did not
attempt to define the term's limits, the court's narrow interpretation
reasonably extends to4 other medically recognized psychological health
impairments as well. '
The distinction espoused by the Court of Appeals between psychological health and psychological impacts in general suffers from conceptual as well as practical problems. Although the majority
acknowledged that health encompasses psychological health, it failed
to recognize that all psychological impacts may affect health for the
purposes of NEPA. For example, although psychological stress may
not be a medically recognizable health effect in itself, stress has been
demonstrated as a cause of psychosomatic disorders. 42 More important, NEPA's language, purpose, and legislative history indicate that
the "human environment" extends beyond man's survival needs to encompass the quality of his existence. 43 Thus, to the extent that mere
anxiety affects man's well-being - in this broader sense - it should be
40. 678 F.2d at 230 n.10.
41. In discussing psychological health, Judge Wright stated that "renewed operation of
TMI- I may cause medically recognized impairment of the psychological health of neighboring residents." Id. at 229 (emphasis added). Further, in his dissent on the AEA issue, see
supra note 4, Judge Wright distinguished psychological health from other psychological effects, stating that "not all fears and worries, of course, are psychological health effects within
the definition of medical science." 678 F.2d at 254 (emphasis added).
42. The symptoms of psychophysiological [psychosomatic] disorders are highly
similar to those of physical diseases. The basic distinction between the two is made
on the basis of cause. Psychophysiological disorders are caused primarily by psychological factors, such as psychological stress, while physical illnesses are caused
by non-psychological agents, such as viruses or faulty diet. It should be realized,
however, that recent research has indicated that almost all physical illnesses are
either caused, exacerbated, or prolonged to some extent by psychological factors.
C. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW 77 (1983).

43. During the Senate hearings, Senator Jackson emphasized that:
today's concern for problems of environmental quality goes far beyond the conservation of expendable resources and problems of waste disposal and public health. It encompasses all of these matters of human survival but it also includes the aspirations of
our citizens for a life among surroundings which afford tranquility, opportunity for
diversity of experience, and the enrichment of human existence.
NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct."Hearingson S 1075, S. 1752 and S, 237 Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1969) (statement of Sen.
Henry Jackson, Chairman).
Accordingly, psychological health for the purposes of NEPA can be viewed broadly
to extend to all psychological impacts that affect the "quality of life." See Town of Groton
v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344,347 n.6 (D. Conn. 1972) (holding "anything that influences urban
dwellers' quality of life is relevant when weighing significance").

19831
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considered under NEPA despite the lack of a "medically recognizable"
health impairment. Accordingly, all psychological impacts upon
humans should be recognized under the Act because of their potential
effect upon human well-being. Under this broad interpretation of
NEPA, psychological health, as defined by the majority, is cognizable
along with those psychological impacts that do not necessarily rise to
the level of "medically recognized" health effects. All psychological
impacts thus would become a part of the Act's threshold test of whether
the federal action "significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment."" This approach would allow an agency to exclude frivolous
psychological claims, while requiring an agency to assess the environmental consequences of all "significant" psychological impacts.45
The dissent stressed that the majority's cognizability test creates an
artificial distinction that fails to recognize the interrelation of all psychological impacts upon human well-being. ' The agencies' inability
to distinguish between various psychological impacts will force those
agencies to consider all psychological impacts under NEPA.47 Judge
Wilkey concluded that such a result is unsupported by the Act because
Congress did not intend NEPA to encompass all these subjective, unmeasurable effects.
The basic flaw in both the majority's cognizability standard and
the dissent's criticism of that standard lies in their underlying premise
that NEPA does not generally encompass psychological reactions to
federal projects. They base this premise upon a line of cases involving
psychological fear. A close analysis of psychological fear, and the reasons that have been used to exclude it, reveals that the exclusion from
the Act of both fear and psychological impacts in general is unfounded.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). See supra notes 2, 30-32.

45. A distinction should be noted between PANE's two contentions. PANE's second
contention, involving community stability, is a psychological impact upon the community,
rather than upon individuals. Accordingly, this psychological impact is a cognizable "secondary" impact that will not trigger an EIS. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
PANE's first contention involving psychological stress on community residents, however, is
clearly a primary impact under NEPA because it directly impacts upon humans and therefore should trigger an EIS when significant.
46. The dissent thus claimed that "if NEPA embracesfearand anxieties in one [proceeding], it must in all." 678 F.2d at 241 (emphasis in original).

47. Although the dissent was concerned that all psychological impacts will be considered
under NEPA because of the majority's artificial distinction between various psychological
impacts, federal agencies most likely will interpret the majority's holding very strictly. The
NRC already has indicated that it intends to construe PANE narrowly. In a statement of
policy published in the Federal Register, the NRC stated that "in ruling on NEPA conten-

tions alleging psychological stress resulting from Commission-licensed activities, [adjudicatory boards] should assure that all the elements described [in PANE] are present." 47 Fed.
Reg. 31,762-763 (July 22, 1982).
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II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FEAR: AN INADEQUATE BASIS FOR EXCLUDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS UNDER

NEPA

Most cases dealing with psychological reactions to federal projects
involve allegations of psychological fear. 48 These courts have used two
basic rationales against including psychological fear under NEPA: first,
that psychological fear is not sufficiently quantifiable; and second, that
psychological fear is unsubstantiated.
A.

Quanqfication of PsychologicalEffects

The argument used most often and most successfully against the
cognizability of psychological impacts has been that these effects are
not sufficiently quantifiable for the purposes of the Act. The Hanly
cases 49 from the Second Circuit were the first to discuss psychological
contentions under NEPA. The plaintiffs in Hanly J,50 who consisted of
local city residents, contended that the General Service Administration's EIS inadequately discussed the relevant socioeconomic impacts
of locating a correctional facility in New York City. After establishing
that the main thrust of the plaintiffs claim involved a "psychological
distaste" for having a jail in their neighborhood, the court in Hanly II5
remarked that it "doubted" whether such psychological impacts are
cognizable under NEPA because they defy measurement. 5 2 Although
the Hanly court ultimately did not rule upon the cognizability of psychological fear under NEPA,53 other courts have cited Hanly for the
48. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th

Cir. 1975) (holding that NEPA does not require federal agencies to assess the fears of neighborhood residents with respect to the influx of low-income tenants into a federally funded
housing project); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1380 n. 13 (7th

Cir. 1973) (stating that the "sensibilities" of neighborhood residents are uncognizable under
NEPA because those effects are unquantifiable and unsubstantiated); Hanly v. Kliendienst,
471 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that it "doubted" whether psychological factors are
cognizable under NEPA because they are unmeasurable); Monarch Chemical Works v.
Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 657 (D. Neb. 1979) (stating that fears of neighborhood residents
need not be addressed under NEPA in determining whether to build a prison); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1078-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that
fears are uncognizable under NEPA because they cannot be measured). But see Tierrasanta
Community Council v. Richardson, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,309 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1973) (hold-

ing that resident's fears of locating a correctional facility near an elementary school were "so
significant" as to warrant consideration under NEPA).
49. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly I), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972); Hanly v. Kliendienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly II), cert. denied, 412 U.S.

908 (1973).
50. 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 833.
53. In Hanly II, the court determined that the presence of another jail in the area, and
zoning laws permitting the construction of a jail in the neighborhood, were dispositive of the
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proposition that psychological effects need not be addressed in an EIS
because they are not quantifiable.54 Judge Wright, however, rejected
this argument in discussing the cognizability of psychological health in
PANE, stating that "NEPA, moreover, does not authorize federal
agencies to deal with intangible factors by ignoring them.""
The PANE majority's view that NEPA requires agencies to consider environmental impacts, even if they are unquantifiable, is
strongly supported by the statute. The Act requires federal agencies to
"utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach" 56 and to "develop
methods and procedures. . . which will insure thatpresently unquantifled environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with . . . technical considerations."5' 7 Furthermore, NEPA's "hard look" standard5" requires a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable
environmental consequences." 5' 9 The ability to quantify an impact
bears only upon the amount of detailed analysis that an agency is required to give it in an EIS. ° Difficulty of measurement does not perissue. The court thus did not need to determine whether psychological impacts are cognizable under NEPA. Id. at 835.
54. See, e.g., Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d
1369, 1380 n.13 (7th Cir. 1973); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp.
1044, 1078-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But cf. City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925,
930 (D. Conn. 1978).
55. 678 F.2d at 229.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(a) (1976).
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States
57. Id. § 4332(2)(b). See, e.g.,
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the AEC
(now the NRC) was required by NEPA to consider environmental amenities in the licensing
of nuclear power plants). See also Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis. An Inadequate Basisfor
Health, Sarfety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 493
(1980) (stating that "opinions concerning EIS's prepared pursuant to NEPA have adhered to
the balancing requirement without insisting on quantification or monetization of environmental values").
58. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 n.21 (1976); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
The "hard look" standard, as espoused and interpreted by the courts, not only requires that
agencies take a hard look at environmental amenities, but also requires that reviewing courts
in turn take a hard look at agency decisions in order to insure that the agency has taken a
hard look. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 532 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
59. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
See also Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 923 (D. Or. 1977);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933 (N.D. Miss.
1972).
60. Quantification of environmental impacts is a necessary component of analysis
where possible. However, NEPA recognizes in Section 102(2)(B), that certain environmental values and consequences are not susceptible to quantification. It should
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mit an agency to place an impact entirely outside its scope of analysis. 6'
In addition, case law requires agencies to consider other unquantifiable impacts under NEPA. Aesthetics plainly are cognizable under
NEPA despite the difficulties in measuring these impacts. 62 Psychological and aesthetic effects are generally analogous in that they both involve subjective reactions to the perceived environment. Even though
an aesthetic reaction to the design of a particular federal project may be
unmeasurable, these unquantified reactions nevertheless must be considered by an agency and evaluated in an EIS when significant. In City
of New Haven v. Chandler,6 3 the district court, citing the similarity to
psychological effects, discussed the quantification of aesthetic effects:
Aesthetic effects . . . are difficult to measure, in contrast to such
problems as noise, or the pollution of air or water. But the elusive
character of aesthetics does not mean that such concerns are less
weighty. Rather, the impossibility of quantoicationmeans, at most,
that a finding as to the role of aesthetics need not be supportedby
statisticalevidence.'
The analogy to aesthetics has not always lead to an expansive view
be emphasized, however, that although quantification and support of conclusions
by empirical data are highly desirable, courts are aware that the depth to which an
alternative need be studied must be limited by inherent limitations on the ability to
quantify certain environmental information.
M. BAKER, J. KAMING & R. MORRISON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A GUIDE
TO PREPARATION AND REVIEW 135 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 922 (D. Or.
1977) (stating that "lilt is necessary, however, that the EIS indicate the extent to which environmental effects are uncertain or unknown").
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1976). See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1981).
63. 446 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1978).
64. Id. at 930 (citing Hanley H's reference to psychological effects) (emphasis added).
The CEQ described aesthetic effects in its Environmental Quality Report:
The impact of the destruction of the environment on man's perceptions and aspirations
cannot be measured. Yet today citizens are seeking better environments, not only to
escape pollution and deterioration but to find their place in the larger community of life
... . Objections today to offensive sights, odors, and sounds are more widespread
than ever. And these mounting objections are an important indicator of what Americans are unwilling to let happen to the world about them.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT No. 1, at 17
(1970).
Despite the similarities between psychological and aesthetic impacts, the analogy to
aesthetics is not perfect. Aesthetic effects are expressly encompassed within NEPA, but psychological effects are not explicitly included as a potential effect. A greater distinction, however, is that aesthetics can be viewed by objective means, but psychological effects are
subjective in nature. In other words, the design of a federal project may be evaluated somewhat objectively by asking whether the reasonable person would be offended by that project.
Yet assessing the actual level of psychological stress present in an individual requires a subjective test because the relevant issue is the project's impact on the psyche of the person in
question.
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of NEPA. In MarylandNational CapitalPark & Planning Commission
v. United States PostalService,65 Judge Leventhal excluded those aesthetic effects that, like psychological factors, are inherently subjective.
Although Judge Leventhal acknowledged that NEPA does not require
all effects to be quantifiable before they must be considered in an EIS,
he nevertheless regarded a particular effect's quantifiability as bearing
on the intention of Congress to subject that effect to a detailed EIS.6 6
Following Judge Leventhal's reasoning, the dissent in PANE concluded that Congress did not intend NEPA to encompass psychological
impacts that not only are difficult to measure, but are "also entirely
subjective."6 7 The dissent thus contended that although an agency
must assess the risk of a proposed action, Congress did not intend to
force agencies to "assess how people perceive and react to the risk."6
The rationale for excluding subjective perceptions under NEPA,
expressed by Judge Leventhal in MarylandNational CapitalPark and
Planning Commission and adopted by the dissent in PANE, does not
rest upon a statutory requirement of quantifiability. Rather, the actual
concern is efficiency - that agencies would dilute their limited resources by being forced to evaluate these unmeasurable impacts in a
cost-benefit analysis.69 This concern is legitimate and deserves attention under the Act, but, at the same time, it does not justify excluding
psychological impacts from NEPA.
Psychological impacts upon humans can be measured by indirect,
yet reliable methods, and therefore are amenable to cost-benefit analysis by an agency.7" Although "no satisfactory, objective way to meas65. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

66. Id. at 1038. Judge Leventhal stated: "difficulties [in measurement] have a bearing on
the intention of Congress, and whether it contemplated, for example, a requirement of a
detailed [EIS]." Id.
67. 678 F.2d at 241.
68. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
69. See Leventhal, Environmental Deciionmaking, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 523 (1974).
Judge Wilkey plainly adheres to this position in his dissent. See 678 F.2d at 240 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
70. Furthermore, NEPA's legislative history demonstrates an intention on the part of the
drafters to include subjective perceptions - including psychological factors - in an
agency's cost-benefit analysis despite difficulties of measurement. A special report entitled
"A National Policy for the Environment," submitted to the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, stated that "ways must be found to add cost-benefit analysis to nonquantifiable, subjective values for environmental amenities." The report defined those
amenities as "recreational, esthetic, [and]psyche." 115 CONG. REc. 29,082 (1969) (emphasis
added).
The NEPA regulations further state that "the [EIS] shall, when a cost benefit analysis is prepared, discuss the relationship between that analysis and any analyses of unquantifled environmental impacts, values and amenities." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1981).
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ure psychological stress"' I may exist presently, scientists can measure
behavioral responses, and biochemical and physiological reactions to
stress. These objective measures can serve as functional indicators, and
even predictors, of stress in groups of residents. Furthermore, although
self-report measures may be inherently subjective "due to individual
differences in how one appraises stress conditions,"72 the development
of standardized questionnaires greatly facilitates the use of psychological impacts in a cost-benefit analysis." Because psychological impacts
are sufficiently quantifiable for the purposes of a cost-benefit analysis,
their consideration will not overburden the agency.
B.

UnsubstantiatedFears

Other courts have excluded psychological fear from analysis under
NEPA because it is unsubstantiated." These cases have paralleled the
dissent's reasoning that altho ugh NEPA should be concerned with mitigating risks to health and safety, considering and mitigatingfears of
those risks is too far removed from the purposes of the Act. Thus, in
First National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson," the Seventh Circuit

stated that even if psychological fears were quantifiable, the court
"questioned" whether psychological fears could be cognizable without
clear proof that the plaintiffs fears are substantiated.76
Most psychological fear cases that have excluded fear because it is
71. See C. BARTOL, supra note 42, at 68-69. The American Psychological Association
(APA), in its amicus curiae brief submitted to the court of appeals in support of PANE,
attempted to demonstrate the quantifiability of psychological impacts. The brief outlined
four basic means by which to measure these subjective impacts:
[F]irst, self-report measures which involve direct questioning of subjects about their
feelings, beliefs, opinions, and symptoms; second, behavioral measures which either
record coping mechanisms or measure some ability or skill during or after exposure to
the stressful event; third psycho-physiological assessments of the responses by one or
more organ systems (e.g., cardiovascular, respiratory); and finally, biochemcial measures of endocrine response to stressful conditions.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents at
10, sub nom Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W. 4371
(U.S. April 19, 1983).
In addition, PANE submitted preliminary plans for the measurement of the residents' psychological stress to the Atomic Safety Licensing Board, see supra note 8, from
which the Board concluded: "The intervenors have, in our view, established a sufficient
prehearing basis for the premise that the effects are measurable." 11 N.R.C. 297, 302 n.8
(1980).
72. See C. BARTOL, supra note 42, at 69.

73. Id. In addition, the use of standardized questionnaires in the place of individual
interviews would minimize the cost of assessing psychological effects.
74. See supra note 48.
75. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 1380 n.13.
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unsubstantiated arose in the context of evaluating criminal activity, or
the propensity of particular individuals to commit crime, where a federal project had brought a certain class of persons into a neighborhood.
In all the psychological fear cases, the plaintiffs alleged that groups of
persons brought in by the federal project would alter the "social fabric"
of the neighborhood, reduce property values, and increase criminal activity. In stating that these fears were unsubstantiated, the courts discussed psychological fear only in connection with the impact upon the
neighborhood's safety.
These cases excluded the use of fear as an evidentiary tool. In
other words, fear was being used to predict the significance of criminal
activity in an area. In Trinity EpiscopalSchool Corp. v. Romney,7 7 for
example, the court considered whether residents' fears could be used to
demonstrate an impact upon community stability caused by the propensity of certain individuals to commit anti-social acts. The court
stated, "fears . . are [not] objective criteria of community stability
and as such do not fall within the ambit of a NEPA study."7 8
The courts are correct in excluding fear from the NEPA process
when that fear is used to demonstrate the significance of another effect.
Fear does not necessarily correlate with the significance of an alleged
risk and therefore is not relevant in assessing the risk.79 This does not
mean, however, that psychological fear should be excluded from
NEPA as an effect in itself. The Act was designed to protect against
significant adverse impacts upon the human environment, and federal
agencies therefore should consider psychological impacts regardless of
whether that reaction is substantiated by a significant risk.
First, fears may prove justified and rational, despite an agency's
determination that an alleged risk is insignificant for the purpose of the
Act. When a particular risk is deemed improbable, an agency's obligation under NEPA to consider that risk is reduced accordingly. Thus,
the "insignificance" of a risk may only be a consequence of a finding by
that agency that the risk is highly remote." Before the TMI accident,
the NRC did not assess the consequences of major nuclear accidents
because the Commission determined that the probability of such acci77. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975).
78. Id. at 1079 (emphasis added).
79. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EViD. 401.
80. See, e.g., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(stating that an agency need not "'foresee the unforeseeable' ").
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dents was too remote to require detailed analysis. 8 ' Yet, in the aftermath of the TMI accident, risk assessment for nuclear power plants has
been widely criticized as inadequate.8 2 Under these circumstances, unsubstantiated fears may nevertheless be rational under NEPA.
More important, when a psychological reaction to a federal project
is unjustified in terms of the actual risk that is created, these irrationally based fears nevertheless should be considered under NEPA because the psychological impact may be significant regardless of the
actual risk involved. Because one of NEPA's primary purposes is to
restore public confidence in federal actions, the sometimes irrational
reactions of individuals must be considered. 3 The majority implicitly
adhered to this notion by holding that psychological impacts that affect
psychological health must be considered, without discussing whether
those psychological effects are rational. Thus, if a psychological reaction to a risk created by a federal project causes significant psychological harm, then NEPA should encompass that impact, irrespective of
whether the risk has been found insignificant, or whether the fear is
deemed irrational.
Despite these concerns over subjectivity, unquantifiability, and unsubstantiability, some courts have required an EIS to evaluate the psychological impacts of a federal project. Most notably, in Tierrasanta
81. See, e.g., Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 510 F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally Karp, JudicialReview of
EnvironmentalImpact Statement Contents, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 127, 140 (1978).
82. See, e.g., A PlantAccident Study Shows "Worst Case" Could Be Worse Than Old
NRC Estimates, Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1982, at Al, col. 1. See also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT No. 2, at 373-74 (1980) ("The
Council reviewed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) environmental analysis of

nuclear power plant accidents and found it seriously deficient.").
The Kemeny Commission, which was established to study the effects of the TMI
accident, reported: "The NRC is unable to fulfill its responsibility for providing an acceptable level of safety for nuclear power plants." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR A CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF

TMI 56 (1979).
83. Senator Jackson stated, in discussing NEPA in Congress, that "[a] primary purpose
of the bill is to restore public confidence in the Federal Government's capacity to achieve

important public purposes and objectives." 115 CONG. REc. 19,010 (1969). Although fulfilling this purpose may entail taking into consideration the subjective perceptions of residents,
which may be irrational, this purpose has been regarded as necessary:

Some have asserted that the events at TMI did not at all call into question the inherent
safety of the technology, arguing that this worst case resulted only in low, safe levels of
public radiation exposure. No matter how true this may be, to make such an assertion
simply ignores the practical fact that people were worried. Moreover, it exemplifies the

need for a better understanding of what the public thinks and for a better effort to
increase its level of comprehension.

Kennedy, Nuclear Power in the Post-TMI Era, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1980, at 84.
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Community Council v. Richardson,84 the court held that the resident's
fears of a correctional facility that was to be built near an elementary
school were "so significant""5 as to warrant the preparation of an EIS
under NEPA. Other courts have considered psychological impacts in a
number of cases dealing with man's psychological reactions to his surroundings. In Chelsea NeighborhoodAssociationv. United States Postal
Service,86 for example, the Second Circuit held that the psychological
reactions of tenants to living in a high-rise apartment atop a postal facility were properly considered under NEPA. In addition, NEPA has
been applied to such diverse psychological effects as the "psychic irritation" of commuting,87 the "dissatisfactions" arising from nonresident
ownership,8 and the psychological harm attending relocation.89 Furthermore, a federal agency recently has announced its plans to prepare
an EIS in order to consider the "physical and psychological separation
of a minority neighborhood." 9
C. A Qualification
In espousing an approach that includes all psychological impacts
under NEPA, one caveat should be emphasized: Federal agencies
must be cautious in applying NEPA in situations where the fundamental rights of another group of persons are involved. NEPA requires
that implementation of its goals and policies should be "consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy." 9' NEPA's legislative
history, in discussing the values that underly a national environmental
policy, emphasized that "if it is ethical. . . to want to obtain the best
that life has to offer without prejudicing equal opportunities for others,
then the cornerstone of environmental policy is ethical." 92 NEPA
93
plainly was not intended to be used as an exclusionary zoning tool.
Thus, when a significant psychological harm is manifested in a group
of residents because of their reaction to other persons, federal agencies
must carefully weigh that harm against the risk of affecting the fundamental rights of the other group of persons. 94
84. 4 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,309 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1973).
85. Id. at 20,311.
86. 516 F.2d 378, 388 (2d Cir. 1975).

87.
88.
Minn.
89.

Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 351 (D. Conn. 1972).
Cedar-Riverside Environmental Defense Fund v. Hills, 422 F. Supp. 294, 317-20 (D.
1977).
National Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649 (1980).

90. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,574 (1979).

91. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1976).
92. 115 CONG. REC. 29,073 (1969).

93. See, e.g., Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 350 (D. Conn. 1972).
94. For a discussion of the use of NEPA in relation to the civil rights of prospective
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The psychological effects alleged in all of the psychological fear
cases were caused by the establishment of jails within a city, the influx
of low-income workers to staff federal projects, and the influx of lowincome tenants into federally funded housing projects. In all these
cases, the risks were allegedly caused by the influx of persons into a
community. In MarylandNational CapitalPark Planning Commission
v. PostalService," the court explicitly stated that effects caused by the
presence of an undesirable group of persons do not fall within the
scope of NEPA:
A secondary, and related factor was the prospect of an influx of
low income workers into the County. Concerned persons might
fashion a claim, supported by linguistics and etymology, that there
is an impact from people pollution on "environment.," if the term
be stretched to its maximum. We think this type of effect can not
fairly be projected as having been within the contemplation of
Congress.
The influence of this factor in determining the outcome in these fear
cases is unquestionably strong.9 7 Moreover, commentators support the
exclusion of psychological impacts based upon this policy consideration.9 8 Yet this policy consideration does not support the exclusion of
fear or psychological impacts in other circumstances. Thus, to the extent that the fear cases were decided on the basis of an influx of persons, they do not conflict with holding psychological impacts
cognizable under NEPA.
III.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS IN THE

NEPA PROCESS

NEPA serves often conflicting goals. Although the Act is concerned with protecting human well-being, Congress did not intend to
do so at any cost. The subjective nature of psychological impacts,
residents, see Comment, NEPA, Tipping andthe Citing of Low-Income PublicHousing: The
Dangers of Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 6 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 46-

53 (1979).
95. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 1037.
97. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th

Cir. 1975); Como-Falcon Coalition v. United States Dep't of Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850, 857
n.2 (D.Minn. 1978).
98. See McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEP4 Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L.

801, 862-63 (1977) ("Courts and agencies should guard against attempts, obstensibly
motivated by concern for the environment, to forestall amelioration of the conditions of the
REV.

disadvantaged ....

NEPA should not be employed as an exclusionary zoning statute.");

Comment, supra note 94 at 32 (strong policy reasons exist against extending the scope of
NEPA to claims that give "NEPA a potentially exclusionary impact that could go far toward
undermining the gains achieved by civil rights advocates").
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which causes inherent difficulties in measurement, can potentially
worsen the long delays and burdensome costs already present in preparing an EIS. 99 Futhermore, the inclusion of psychological effects can
affect not only the entire nuclear industry, but potentially all areas
where NEPA is applicable. Although efficiency is a factor in applying
NEPA, this consideration should not exclude psychological effects from
the NEPA process.
The NEPA regulations" °° offer a number of rules and procedures
designed to lessen the burdens placed upon agencies in preparing an
EIS. These regulations can be used to limit the amount of detailed
analysis that is required of an agency, as well as to preclude the consideration of unwarranted psychological claims under NEPA in the future. For example, the 1979 regulations introduced a new procedure
called "scoping"'' ° which should enhance an agency's ability to deal
with psychological impacts. The scoping process allows federal agencies to prepare for an EIS10 2 by identifying, limiting in scope, and even
excluding potential impacts of a federal project. The agency thus will
not be forced to devote an overabundance of resources to evaluating
psychological claims.
In addition, NEPA mandates that only "significant" effects trigger
an EIS.10 3 Accordingly, "mere dissatisfactions arising from social
opinions, economic concerns, or political disagreements with agency
policies'" '° will not trigger an EIS when they are found insignificant.
Finally, when evaluating "significant" psychological impacts, NEPA's
"hard look" standard limits an agency's analysis to a "reasonably thorough" discussion of the environmental consequences.° 5 Thus, the unavailability of data will reduce the agency's obligation to evaluate the
impact.
Subjective perceptions play an integral role in NEPA's environmental policy,1° 6 and psychological impacts have been recognized as a
part of that policy. Accordingly, the most efficient method for dealing
99. See generally Karp, The NEPA Regulations, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 295, 299-304 (1981).
100. The 1979 NEPA regulations were promulgated by the CEQ with three goals in
mind: reducing paperwork, lessening costs and delays, and facilitating environmentally
sound decisions. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1500.5(1982).
101. Id. § 1501.7.

102. The scoping process, however, cannot be used in determining whether to prepare an
SEIS. The regulations provide that agencies shall prepare an SEIS in the same manner as
an EIS "exclusive of scoping." Id § 1502.9(c)(4).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). See supra note 2.
104. 678 F.2d at 230.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. In discussing NEPA in the Congress, Senator Jackson emphasized the subjective
nature of NEPA's policy:
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with frivolous claims and wasted resources, that will also insure that
NEPA's goals are not frustrated, is through the Act's process. Although additional costs are associated with broadening NEPA's scope
to include psychological reactions, NEPA's procedural requirements
can be used to minimize these costs, while insuring that significant psychological harms are considered and evaluated by the agency in accordance with NEPA's purpose to "encourage productive and
'0 7
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

By limiting its holding to psychological health under NEPA, the
majority attempted to accommodate the "unique" circumstances surrounding the Three Mile Island nuclear accident without creating
havoc in the form of unwarranted psychological claims in the future.
The majority's holding, however, does not facilitate a clear understanding of the proper role of psychological impacts in general under
NEPA.'0 8 Instead, the court's expressed "severity" standard is very
likely to prove unworkable in the Act's process."
Psychological impacts should be encompassed within the scope of
NEPA. Significant psychological effects would be protected under the
Act, while insignificant anxieties and fears would be excluded from detailed analysis by federal agencies. This approach will help "assure for
all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.""'

Recent years have witnessed a growing public concern for the quality of the
environment and the manner in which it is managed. . . . Most often it is seen in the
form of citizen indignation and protest over the [government's] actions. . . . Examples
of the rising public concern over the manner in which Federal policies and activities
have contributed to environmental decay and degradation may be seen in the. . . federally sponsored or aided construction activities such as highways, airports, and other
public works projects which proceed without reference to the desires and aspirations of
local people.
115 CONG. REC. 19,010 (1969). See also Note, The Psychology ofthe Designed Environment:
NEPA and Public Housing, 60 IowA L. REv. 674, 683 (1975) (stating that the "environment
should be seen as including the totality of inputs - both natural and man made -perceived
by the individual") (emphasis added).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
108. See Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 687
F.2d 732, 741 n.20 (3rd Cir. 1982) (citing PANE for the proposition that psychological impacts must be considered in an EIS "under some circumstances").
109. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1976).

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY V DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
-

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RESCISSION OF

AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Department of Transportation,' the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit held the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of the passive restraint requirement of Federal motor vehicle safety standard 2082 (Standard 208) to
be arbitrary and capricious.' The court concluded that a broad scope
of review was necessary because the rescission reversed a long-standing
agency policy promoting passive restraints,4 and therefore rescission
would be unjustified unless supported by a rational explanation and a
reasoned, good faith effort to consider alternative ways of advancing
the agency's purpose.5 Although the State Farm court followed a questionable route in reaching this decision, which included heavy reliance
on postenactment legislative history,6 the case suggests a workable test
which may be helpful in future cases where the rescission of an agency
rule is at issue.7
This case presents the latest development in a long-standing controversy over the means by which highway safety shall be promoted.
1. 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 340 (1982). This case consolidates two independent actions for judicial review of the NHTSA's rescission of the passive
restraint standard - No. 81-2220 brought by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
and No. 81-2221 brought by the National Association of Independent Insurers and the Automobile Owners Action Council. Intervenors in the case included the Automobile Importers of America, Inc., the Consumer Alert and Pacific Legal Foundation, the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association, and the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York.
2. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2, amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
3. 680 F.2d at 230. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, found at 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1976) of the Administrative Procedure Act, applies to rulemaking conducted pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(b)(1976), which states that this section shall apply to all orders "establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard under this subchapter." (emphasis
added).
4. 680 F.2d at 220-21.
5. Id. at 229-30. The court remanded the case to NHTSA for further assessment, directing the agency to prepare a schedule for implementing Modified Standard 208 unless it
could find nonarbitrary reasons to justify suspension or delay. Id. at 240-41. For subsequent action in the case, see infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
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Because the central issue in this case - whether the rescission was arbi-

trary and capricious -

involves past agency responses to that contro-

versy, a review of the background to Standard 208 is necessary before
analyzing the State Farm decision.

I.

BACKGROUND

In 1966, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act' (the Safety Act) for the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents."9 In passing this act, Congress intended safety to be the
overriding consideration.' 0 The Safety Act directs that the Secretary of

Transportation or his delegate "shall establish by order appropriate
Federal motor vehicle safety standards [that] shall be practicable, shall
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective
terms." ''
Although safety is the most important consideration, in requiring
that the standards be practicable, the agency "must of necessity consider many variables, and make 'trade-offs' between various desiderata
in deciding upon a particular standard for auto safety."' 2 These factors
include collateral risks posed by the standard, public reception, cost,
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
10. Brief of Petitioner State Farm at 36, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of
Transp., 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2709, 2714, where the Senate Commerce

Committee stated: "The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration
in the issuance of standards under this bill."). See also the statement in a House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Report: "Motor vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of this bill and each standard must be related thereto." H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976). The use of the word "shall" in NHTSA's mandate has
been interpreted by congressmen as making it mandatory for the agency to issue motor
vehicle safety standards. See the comments of Sen. Wirth, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, Committee on Energy and
Commerce:
Given that Congress specifically set out what it expected NHTSA to do, one thing is
abundantly clear - we did not give NHTSA a choice as to whether or not to promote
safety. Congress required the agency to establish safety standards to save lives, to reduce injuries and to meet the need for motor vehicle safety.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Oversight and Authorization. Hearings on
Authorization and Oversight Before the Subcomm on Telecommunications, ConsumerProtection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Congress, 2d Sess.,
March 23, 1982.
That the word "shall" is meant to be a command is supported by case law. See, e.g.,
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1934)(stating that the word "shall" used in a statute is
"the language of command").
12. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 342 (D.C.Cir. 1968).
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and prevailing economic situations, any of which could affect the success of the proposed standard.'" The Safety Act further requires the
Secretary, in developing these standards, to consider relevant available
motor vehicle safety data, whether the proposed standard is "reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle for which it is prescribed, and the extent to which the standard
14
contributes to carrying out the purpose of the Safety Act.
A.

The Administrative History of Standard208

Pursuant to the above guidelines, in 1967 the Department of
Transportation (DOT) issued the original Standard 208 requiring
seatbelts in all cars.' 5 This regulation was in response to congressional
concern with injuries resulting from the "second collision," or the collision of the passenger with the interior of the automobile.' 6 By 1969,
DOT concluded that the level of seatbelt usage was too low, and issued
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to consider the development
and installation of the so-called "passive restraint" systems.' 7 Passive
restraints, also called automatic restraints, are defined as crash protection devices in an automobile "by means that require no action by vehicle occupants" to be effective.'S These include air bags, which inflate
upon impact to cushion the occupant, and passive seatbelts, which automatically enclose vehicle occupants when they enter the vehicle and
close the door. The passive restraint can either supplement (in the case
of air bags) or replace (in the case of passive seatbelts) the manual
seatbelts presently installed in cars. The latter are called "active restraints" because they require the user to buckle them in order to be
effective. In 1970 DOT formally revised Standard 208 to require pas13. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Dep't of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345-47 (D.C. Cir.
1979)(finding that under the Safety Act public reaction and collateral dangers must be evaluated in order to determine practicability).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1),(3),(4) (1976).
15. 49 C.F.R. § 571.21 (1967).

16. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966): "The 'second collision' - the
impact of the individual within the vehicle against the steering wheel, dashboard, windshield, etc. - has been largely neglected. The committee was greatly impressed by the critical distinction between the causes of the accident itself and causes of the resulting death or
injury."
17. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Highway Administration, 34
Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969)(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. ch. III)(proposed July 2, 1969). Entitled
"Inflatable Occupant Restraint Systems," this Notice suggested requiring the installation of
passive restraints and discussed the advantages of air bags. Id. It also suggested that other
forms of passive restraints, which had not yet been developed to the stage where they would
provide compliance with the standard, may eventually satisfy the requirement. Id
18. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1981).
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sive restraints. 19
NHTSA was established by Congress in the Highway Safety Act
of 1970, and was delegated authority under the Safety Act, including
the authority to administer the passive restraint program. 20 From
NHTSA's inception until 1976, the decisions concerning passive restraints rested with the Administrator of NHTSA.2 1 In March 1976,
however, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman assumed ultimate control over the standard because of the controversial nature of
the rule.22 Coleman then suspended the requirement in 1977,23 substituting instead a large-scale test to determine the effectiveness of passive
restraints and an educational program to increase public awareness and
to promote eventual acceptance of passive restraints. 24 But his successor, Brock Adams, reopened the rulemaking four months later because
he was concerned that the suspension was not consistent with the mandate of the Safety Act. 25 Determining that a test and an educational
program need not precede implementation, he issued a new passive restraint rule, Modified Standard 208.26 Modified Standard 208 provided
the same requirements as the earlier standard, but set out a new phasein schedule (based on vehicle size) for its implementation.2 7 The new
schedule was in effect over three years when current DOT decisionmakers assumed their duties in January, 1981.
19. 49 C.F.R. § 571.21 (1970).
20. 23 U.S.C. § 401 note (1976).
21. HOUSE SUBCOMMrI"TEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM

94th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Federal Regulation and Regulatory
Reform].
22. 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976) ("It is in the context of this controversy that I must make

a decision as to the future of passive restraints.").
23. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 5071 (1977).

24. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,290 (1977).
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,935 (1977) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208) (proposed March
24, 1977). Secretary Adams stated:

I am concerned that this recent decision by the Department [to suspend the passive
restraint requirement] may not be entirely consistent with the statutory mandate of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. . .to issue standards to reduce highway deaths and injuries. . . .I cannot agree that consumers would respond to passive
restraints in the same fashion as the ignition-interlock. The ignition-interlock was a
"forced-action" system that required the vehicle occupant to operate the seat belts each
time the car was started . .

.

. In direct contrast, the passive restraint system requires

no action to be effective. In the case of inflatable-cushion-type restraints, it is not even
visible to the occupant.
Id. at 15,935-36.
26. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977).

27. The phase-in schedule for Modified Standard 208 ordered large cars to comply by
September 1, 1982, mid-size cars by September 1, 1983, and small cars by September 1,
1984. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.2 (1977).
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B.

Rescission of Modified Standard208

In April 1981, NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking suggesting the rule's rescission, citing as major reasons the substantial economic impact of passive restraints on manufacturer and consumer
costs, as well as the economic difficulties faced by the automobile industry.28 NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint rule in October 1981,
stating as its reason the "uncertainty about the public acceptability and
probable usage rate of the type of automatic restraint which the car
manufacturers planned to make available to most new car buyers. 29
NHTSA found that most car manufacturers would use "detachable"
passive belts which were functionally equivalent to the currently used
"active" belts and hence would perpetuate the low usage rates associated with active restraints.3" Therefore, NHTSA believed that enforcing Modified Standard 208 would be an exercise in futility because no
appreciable positive result could be predicted reliably.3 Also, NHTSA
decided that it should not amend the standard to preclude detachable
passive belts for reasons of cost, equity, public receptivity, and safety.32
After notice of the rescission, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company brought an action for judicial review, arguing that
statistical evidence had demonstrated the safety3 3 and cost effectiveness 34 of both air bags and passive seatbelts. State Farm argued that if
NHTSA found detachable passive belts unable to produce the protection desired by passive restraints, then NHTSA erred in rescinding the
rule rather than amending it to require nondetachable passive belts. 35
In reaching its decision, the court described the agency's rescission as
"a paradigm of arbitrary and capricious agency action because the
NHTSA drew conclusions that are unsupported by evidence in the rec28. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205 (1981) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208)(proposed April 9,
1981). Rescission of the passive restraint requirement was one of three alternatives considered by the Department of Transportation. Another was to reverse the sequence of compliance so that small cars would be required to comply first, then mid-sized cars, then large
cars. The third alternative would have required all cars to comply on March 1, 1983. The
latter two alternatives would also have included an amendment that passive restraints not be
required in the front center seat. Id. at 21,207. NHTSA also simultaneously published an
order postponing the implementation date for large cars until the 1983 model year. 49
C.F.R. § 571.208, amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (1981).
29. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981) (repealing 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 § 4.1.3).
30. Amendments to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419,
53,421-23 (1981)(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 § 4.1.1.1).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 53,423-24.
33. Brief for Petitioner State Farm at 17-24.
34. Id. at 39-42.
35. Id. at 48-49.
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ord, [and]. . .thus failed to demonstrate the reasoned3 decision-mak6
ing that is the essence of lawful administrative action."
NHTSA's response on remand suggested several long-term studies
designed to gather additional evidence supporting its rescission.37
Upon receiving this answer, the court, sua sponte, ordered Modified
Standard 208 to take effect on September 1, 1983, giving NHTSA one
month in which to reply should it find a sufficient basis for not complying with the court's order. 38 The Supreme Court granted a petition for
writ of certiorari for argument during the 1982 term, 39 and the Court of
Appeals suspended its order to reinstate the standard pending review
by the Supreme Court.'
II.

ANALYSIS

The court found the "most troublesome" issue to be determining
the intensity with which it should examine the record.4 ' Although the
parties agreed that the appropriate standard of review was the "arbitrary and capricious" standard under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),4 2 the court observed that this standard
was a coat of many colors, encompassing "intensive as well as deferen36. 680 F.2d at 208-09.

37. Notice of Filing submitted to the Court of Appeals on July 1, 1982 to comply with
the court's deadline on remand. Attached to this notice was a notice of proposed rulemaking and appendix that NHTSA intended to publish in the Federal Register, but which was
no longer appropriate after the court reinstated Modified Standard 208 in response to this
notice. In addition to requesting comments from interested parties, this notice and appendix
proposed several long-term studies, to take from one and a half to two years to complete.
These studies suggested controlled experiments under neutral, unbiased circumstances. The
studies were designed to provide data gathered through direct observation of users who
would be representative of the national population of motorists, passive belts representative
of the various belt designs that would be likely to be offered to the public, and cars representative of the various sizes available to the public. App. at 2-4. The proposed formats included a private study with a large number of sales to a limited geographical area, a
corporate fleet study, and a rental car study. Id. at 5-11.
38. Order and Memorandum of the Court of Appeals, August 4, 1982, State Farm.
39. 103 S.Ct. 340 (1982).
40. Order and Memorandum of the Court of Appeals, November 19, 1982, State Farm.
41. 680 F.2d at 218.
42. Id. at 220. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is found at 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)(1976), and states:
To the extent necessary to decision when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisons, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall (2) hold unlawful and set aside conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ....
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or

1983]

STATE FARM

645

tial judicial scrutiny depending in part on 'the nature of the particular
problem faced by the agency.' ",43 Generally deferential to an agency's
decision, the arbitrary and capricious standard has been vaguely dethose parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 337-38 (D.C. Cir.
1968), held that the arbitrary and capricious standard was the correct test to apply when
reviewing challenges to a rule under the Safety Act. Other decisions have found the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable to informal agency rulemaking unless another standard is specified by the agency's mandate, such as the substantial evidence standard, used to
review formal agency action or other action that is "on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute," 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E) (1976). See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 14142 (1973) (finding the arbitrary and capricious standard appropriate for reviewing informal
agency action); Pacific Legal Found. v. Dep't of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (reviewing Modified Standard 208 to determine whether it was "consistent with its
statutory mandate, rational, and not arbitrary"); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-34
(1976) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to review of informal rulemaking), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generaliy K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 29.00-1 (1982 Supp.) (discussing the applicability of the arbitrary and capricious standard
to informal agency action); Verkuil, JudicalReview ofInformalRulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv.
185, 206 (1974) ("It has been widely assumed that section 706(2)(A), which provides that the
reviewing court should set aside action which is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law' is applicable to informal rulemaking."). But see
Assure Competetive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding the arbitrary and capricious standard the correct test for reviewing a policy statement,
but the substantial evidence test the proper one for review of a rule); Chrysler Corp. v.
Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 669 (6th Cir. 1972) (claiming that the substantial evidence
test applies to review of the original Standard 208, an informal agency rule); Note, Judiial
Review ofthe Facts in InformalAuiemaking: A ProposedStandard,84 YALE L. J. 1750, 1756-

58 (1975)(stating that the Supreme Court has suggested in several opinions, in dicta, that the
substantial evidence standard is applicable to review of informal rulemaking).
Most courts, however, will require that the substantial evidence standard be used for
cases involving review of formal rulemaking, or where the agency's statute requires a hearing. See, e.g., Boating Industry Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1969); California
Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 53 (9th Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 389 U.S.
844 (1967).
43. 680 F.2d at 219 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). This standard has been described as a "multifaceted" scope of review. E.g., National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir.
1979)("In applying the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard, it is well to keep in mind the
considerations that led Congress to commit to the courts a 'multifaceted review function.' ")
(quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Weyerhaeuser Co., v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("In its totality, at all events, [the arbitrary and
capricious standard) is indicative of a multifaceted review function committed to the
courts."); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1974)("Judicial review of inherently legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an undertaking of different dimensions.").
Petitioner in State Farm requested that a broad scope of review be applied, that is,
an "intensive and exacting scrutiny," while respondent contended that the court should exercise "a high degree of deference to the agency's determination," or, a much narrower scope.
680 F.2d at 220 (quoting Brief of Petitioner State Farm at 21, and Brief of Respondent
NHTSA at 19).
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scribed by reviewing courts as requiring a finding of "reasonableness"

or a "rational basis" for the agency action."4
As the court in State Farm noted, a reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 45 The court is not
allowed to examine the record to determine how it would have acted
had it been in the agency's place; rather, the court is restricted to deciding whether the agency could reasonably have taken the action in quesThe State Farm court recognized that the line between
tion.'

substituting judgment and simply judging whether agency action is ra44. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 290
(1974)("[W]e can discern in the Commission's opinion a rational basis for its treatment of
the evidence, and the 'arbitrary and capricious' test does not require more."); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("ITihe Board's determination ... is to
be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."); Mississippi
Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934)("The judicial function is
exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the
administrative body."); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(stating that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review "requires affirmance if a rational basis exists for
the agency's decision."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). But see Mobil Oil v. Dep't of
Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), interpreting this standard as:
The standard of review of agency action alleged to be arbitrary and capricious is not
simply whether there exists a rational basis for the action. Rather. . .the inquiry is
"whether the decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors, whether there
has been a clear error of judgment and whether there is a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body."
Id (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Emer. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Although purportedly rejecting the "rational basis" test, the distinction in Mobil Oil is actually only semantic, because previous courts, including the
Supreme Court, have interpreted the rational basis test as including an examination of
whether the relevant factors were considered and whether the agency committed a clear
error of judgment. Eg., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971); Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 182 (1965)("Once a court decides, however, that the action has been and can
be reasonably attributed to an application of valid factors of choice, it will normally not
interfere with an administrative choice.").
45. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977) ("In
rejecting the conclusion of the [SEC, with regard to their approval of the merger of a closedend investment company into an affiliate company] the Court of Appeals substituted its own
judgment for that of the agency charged by Congress with that responsibility.") (reversing
Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1976)). See also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 29091 (1965)("Thus, in providing for judicial review of administrative procedural rulemaking,
Congress has not empowered district courts to substitute their judgment for that of the
agency.").
46. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1974)("If an agency has 'genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making... the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards.' ")(quoting Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971)).
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tional or arbitrary is sometimes a fine one; 47 nevertheless, the court proceeded with a holding that undoubtedly will be criticized as a
substitution of its judgment for that of NHTSA. As the following analysis will show, however, such criticism is more likely to arise because of
the manner in which the court formulated its conclusion and not because of the result itself.
The court approached its formulation of an appropriate standard
of review in two stages. The first focused on the kind of agency action
involved, 48 and the second on that action's relationship to the agency's
statutory mandate.4 9
A.

Rescission.- Action or Inaction?

As a first step in its analysis, the court distinguished review of
agency inaction (which is subject to very deferential review) from review of agency action (which is more intrusive) and concluded that this
case - rescission of agency action - did not fit neatly into either category and presented a matter of first impression.5 0 Although the court
observed that at first glance the rescission more closely resembled
agency inaction, 5' it concluded that its review should be "thorough,
probing, and in-depth," approximating the more intrusive review nor52
mally applied to agency action.
Application of this distinction to State Farm can be justified for
two reasons. First, deferential review of agency inaction avoids judicially imposed rulemaking.5 3 Because a decision to promulgate a rule
is a legislative function, which Congress has delegated to the agency
and not to the court, a decision by the court to force an agency to promulgate specific rules might frustrate the regulatory scheme established
by Congress.5 4 Without clear error on the part of the agency, courts
47. 680 F.2d at 229.

48. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
50. 680 F.2d at 218-19.
51. Id. at 218.
52. Id. at 228.
53. See, e.g., WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("It is only in the
rarest and most compelling circumstances that this court has acted to overturn an agency
judgment not to institute rulemaking."); Rhode Island Television Corp. v. FCC, 320 F.2d
762, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("Administrative rulemaking does not ordinarily comprehend any
rights in private parties to compel an agency to institute such proceedings or promulgate
rules.").
54. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)("[If the administrative
agency's] grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do
so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the
administrative agency.").
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naturally will be reluctant to follow this course. Instead, when a court
finds an agency's inaction to be arbitrary and capricious, the proper
remedy is to remand the case to the agency to conduct further rulemaking analysis."
Although the remedy in State Farm was an order directing
NHTSA to follow a specific course of action, the court did not substitute its own judgment by formulating an appropriate remedy as it
might have in a case of agency inaction. In State Farm, the remedy
was provided for the court in the form of a rule that NHTSA itself had
spent years formulating. The court did not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency; rather, it simply refused to allow the agency to rescind one of its own remedies, absent valid reasons.
A second reason for limiting the scope of review when agency inaction is involved is the extent of the record available to the reviewing
court. In cases where a rule has been promulgated, a detailed record
usually has been developed; if no agency action is involved, little or no
record may exist.56 In this situation, for a court to provide the relief
most desired by the petitioner, i.e., the implementation of a rule, the
court essentially would have to develop evidence on its own. This
plainly is not an objective of judicial review, as judges have neither the
time nor the expertise required to make such determinations."
By contrast, a very extensive record was available for the State
Farm court to consider because NHTSA had collected, by its own admission, "an enormous record compiled over the past decade on automatic restraints. ' "5 This allowed the court to conduct an in-depth
analysis of the problem without either undertaking studies of its own or
speculating about the advantages of passive restraints.

55.

Thus, when a reviewing court concludes that an agency invested with broad

discretion to fashion remedies has apparently abused that discretion by omitting a
remedy justified in the court's view by the factual circumstances, remand to the
agency for reconsideration, and not enlargement of the agency action, is ordinarily
the proper course.
NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 377, 417 U.S. 1, 10 (1974).
56. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[I]n cases where

the agency has decided against promulgation of a rule, the scope of review is very limited
because the 'record' will likely be a simple statement of reasons for nonadoption.") (emphasis in original).
57. See, e.g., Bazelon, Coping with Technology through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 817, 822 (1977)("[Wlhere administrative decisions on scientific issues are concerned,
it makes no sense to rely upon the court to evaluate the agency's scientific and technological

determinations.").
58. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,420 (1981).
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B. Arbitrary and CapriciousAction or Action Exceeding Delegated
Authority?
After determining that rescission of Modified Standard 208 resembled agency action more closely than agency inaction, and thus required correspondingly less deferential review, the court redefined the
issue as involving not just arbitrary and capricious but also ultra vires
agency action: "Even where there is no claim that the agency has exceeded its jurisdiction, as there is not in this case, sudden and profound
alterations in an agency's policy constitute 'danger signals' that the will
of Congress is being ignored."5 9 Thus, in determining "the scrutiny
with which the arbitrary and capricious standard should be applied" to
the rescission, the court looked to "the extent to which NHTSA's action
may be inconsistent with the congressional purpose behind the Safety
Act."' Although State Farm illustrates the intersection of these limits
on agency action, the court turned to an improper source to define the
scope of authorized agency action and ultimately articulated a test
which is ill founded and which appears unnecessarily intrusive.
Although embodied in different provisions of the APA, the categories of "arbitrary and capricious" agency action and action exceeding
an agency's authority are not mutually exclusive.6" First, the agency
conceivably could take action that is at once unreasonable and outside
its bailiwick: for example, an attempt by NHTSA to encourage birth
control to stem population growth and thus to reduce traffic congestion
would be both unreasonable and ultra vires. Indeed, from an ex post
perspective, any unauthorized agency action could be considered unreasonable: what legitimate purpose could be served by producing a
rule that will be nullified on review?
Second, and more important in State Farm, the agency's mandate
as expressed in its enabling legislation by hypothesis carries affirmative
as well as limiting directives.6 2 Hence agency action, such as rescinding
a regulation, could so inhibit the agency's effectiveness that it no longer
is carrying out its appointed mission. Because the reasonableness of
59. 680 F.2d at 221.
60. Id. at 222.
61. Although § 706(2)(A) provides that agency action may be set aside if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," § 706(2)(C)
provides that agency action may be set aside if it is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right."
62. Section 706(1) provides that "[tlhe reviewing court shall - (1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." See, e.g., Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 187
(D.C. Cir. 1975)(finding that the FCC had unreasonably delayed action on its investigation
of IT&T's telephone rate increases).
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agency action is determined in part by reference to the agency's statutory mandate, such a consequence also would be arbitrary.
In short, a reasonable, nonarbitrary agency is one that does what it
is told by Congress, whether creatively and aggressively or unimaginatively and perfunctorily. These matters yield linedrawing questions:
First, an agency may advance and it may retreat, but it may not wage
someone else's war nor may it surrender. The boundary in each case
must be the statute, the interpretation of which our governmental system in the first instance assigns to the courts. 63 Second, an agency may
take steps that are ill advised, mean spirited, or even stupid, yet these
actions will be legal if they meet some threshold of reasonableness.'
Within the loose confines provided by the APA, that threshold also is
to be determined by the court.
C.

Problems in the Court's Scope-of-Authority Analysis

Although a central issue in State Farm is whether the rescission
was within the scope of NHTSA's delegated authority, the court's analysis is problematic. First, the court's description of the purpose of its
inquiry - as aiding its determination of the level of "scrutiny with
which to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard" 6 - misconceives
the effect of its result. Once the court determines that the agency has
exceeded the range of its delegated authority, it must hold that action
invalid per se. Hence, what the court characterizes as a preliminary
inquiry is actually the dispositive issue. The court's inquiry thus does
not clarify the scope of review, but rather determines the scope of
agency authority.
It is in identifying the limits of agency authority, or more precisely,
whether the rescission falls within those limits, that the court's analysis
63. If an agency has interpreted its statute in a particular way, however, the court will
normally accord a great deal of deference to that interpretation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)(upholding the NLRB's determination that newsboys are "employees" within the meaning of that term as used in the National Labor Relations Act); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941)(holding that courts should not
exercise an independent judgment when reviewing an agency's application of a statutory
term to undisputed facts, but rather should affirm the administrative decision if there is a
rational basis for it). See also L. JAFFE, supra note 44, at 573:
When we say 'discussed in terms of' statutory purpose, we have in mind a concept of
statutory purpose which takes account of the fact that the legislature in realizing its
purposes has chosen to work through an administrative agency, and so (presumptively,
as we have said) to confer on it some policy-making function. This discretion should
normally be permitted to function short of the point where the court is convinced that
the purpose of the statute is contradicted.
64. See supra note 44.
65. 680 F.2d at 222.
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is most troublesome. To determine "the extent to which NHTSA's action may be inconsistent with the congressional purpose," the court embarked on a lengthy review of "the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments to the Safety Act and subsequent congressionalreaction to
Modified Standard 208 . . "66 The court concluded that "the standard had come as close as an agency-made regulation can come to being affirmatively' endorsed by Congress, without Congress actually
having done So. "67
The court's implication that the legality of agency action may be
judged by reference to evidence of subsequent opinion in Congress of
that action ignores the constitutional status of the duly enacted enabling legislation and its amendments.68 Apart from difficulties inherent in determining legislative intent,6 9 the scope of an agency's
delegated authority undoubtedly is defined by the intent of the Congress
thatpassedthe act - not comments made in later committees and debates. To hold otherwise would nullify the act, and thus usurp the constitutional authority of the legislative and executive branches that
enacted it.
Moreover, by this practice a court in effect abdicates its judicial
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 260 (1980) ("To allow the
introduction of such evidence might be tempting in a state where legislative history is generally unavailable, but it is a course that should be avoided.").
Nevertheless, courts sometimes take postenactment legislation into account. In
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1923-25 (1982), the Court relied on
postenactment history of Title IX to uphold the validity of regulations prohibiting discrimination based on gender in employment by educational institutions. Although the Court
claimed it was using postenactment history only to "lend credence" to their decision, it
stated that this history "provides additional evidence of the intended scope of the Title and
confirms Congress' desire to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education
programs." Id. But see id.at 1931 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no evidence in 1972,
when it passed Title IX,that Congress through Title VI applied to employment discrimination."). The dissent continues that in holding as it did, the majority "relies heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on the floor of the Senate." Id. at 1935.
For other examples of cases where postenactment legislative history was used, see
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979)("[O]nce an agency's statutory
construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and the
latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other
respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.") (quoting
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-89 (1940)); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)("Although we cannot accord [postenactment] remarks the
weight of contemporary legislative history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX ....").
69. See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 520-24
(1948)(discussing the insufficiencies inherent with using the language of congressmen to determine the intent of a statute).
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responsibility of statutory interpretation to a committee chairperson in
the political branch.7" Whereas legislative history prior to enactment
can elucidate the reasons supporting that legislature's passage of the
statute, once the statute is enacted it is the province of the judiciary to
interpret the statute and "to say what the law is."'"
Arguably, the availability of a legislative veto adds sufficient formality, and hence credibility, to such evidence. This proposition may
have some merit where the regulation survives a formal vote in both
houses, but it is less convincing where disapproval resolutions are decided in committee. Although the full Senate voted to table a resolution disapproving the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208 in
73
the present case, 72 the House resolution never got out of committee.
Even where disapproval resolutions are submitted to Congress in conformance with a legislative veto provision, legislative inaction on that
resolution does not necessarily indicate that the legislature agrees with
the agency's interpretation of its mandate. Implying acquiescence of
the legislature by their failure to act is inconclusive, because the decision not to act can be based on many factors besides the merits.7 4 In
sum, to determine whether NHTSA's rescission of Modified Standard
208 exceeded the agency's mandate, the court must look to the Safety
Act itself and perhaps pre-enactment legislative history, but not subsequent unenacted congressional responses to the regulation or its
rescission.
D. A Second Problem: The Court's Test
The court justified its recourse to postenactment legislative history
as aiding its determination of how hard it should examine the record.
Together with the abruptness of the agency's course change, the court
concluded that postenactment legislative reaction to the passive restraint standard required that its rescission "be subject to 'thorough,
probing, in-depth review' lest the congressional will be ignored."7 5 In
70. The judiciary has the responsibility of statutory interpretation, and the views of the
current Congress are irrelevant unless those views have been manifested in some formal
legislative action.
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
72. 123 CONG. REC. H33,332 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1977).
73. 680 F.2d at 224. The subcommittee and committee actions were not reported. The
legislative history is recounted in S. REP. No. 481, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). See 680
F.2d at 224 n.22.
74. W. REYNOLDS, supra note 68, at 263-65. See also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1395-96 (tent. ed.

1958)(listing a "variety of reasons which legislators may have either for opposing a bill or
simply withholding the votes necessary for its forward progress").
75. 680 F.2d at 228. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
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effect, the court appears to establish the following proposition: When
an agency attempts to rescind a relatively stable, legislatively promulgated rule, which has not been disapproved by Congress - at least
where a two-house legislative veto provision has brought the issue
before Congress in some formal sense - the agency must present evidence sufficient to meet a stringent standard showing that: (1) the
agency2 s prior course was unjustified,7 6 and (2) it had considered and
reasonably rejected obvious alternatives to rescission, including
amendment or suspension, that would have justified the original
course.77 The court's juxtaposition of these concepts fails as a rule of
law in several respects.
The first difficulty with this formulation is its reliance on postenactment legislative history to determine the proper scope of authority,
which has been discussed previously.7 Another difficulty is that the
court applies its test in a way that seems overly stringent.
By casting the issue in terms of the depth of review, the court appears to apply a very intrusive test. The court found that NHTSA must
refute its prior course by showing evidence that the prior course was
unjustified, not by presenting evidence that its present course is justified.79 This approach suggests that the court has substituted its judgment for that of the agency, its disclaimers to the contrary
notwithstanding, because the court in effect rejected the evidence for
recission presented by the agency. The court thus appeared to regard
itself as capable of exercising expertise in the auto safety field. Furthermore, by limiting the procedures that the agency must follow in taking
action, the court's statement is arguably violative of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Plant v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.8o
In the area of judicial review, much seems to depend on the choice
of words. A more careful formulation might have led the court to the
same result, while resting on a more defensible basis.

415 (1972) (interpreting the arbitrary and capricious standard as requiring a "thorough,
probing, in-depth review") quoted MnState Farm, 680 F.2d at 219.
76. Id. at 233.
77. Id. at 232.
78. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
79. 680 F.2d at 231 ("mhe question is not whether evidence shows that usage rates will
increase by the necessary amount, but whether there is evidence showing they will not.
NHTSA has some burden, in other words, to show that a regulation once considered to
prevent deaths and injuries efficiently can no longer be expected to do so.").
80. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee held that "[algencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally
not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." d. at 524.
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E. A ProposedTest Suggested by the State Farm Opinion
The court's opinion in State Farm suggests an approach for analyzing the legality of an agency about-face. The proposed formulation
is simply stated: When an agency abruptly abandons a previous course
of regulation, the earlier findings and conclusions form a part of the
record (as though submitted by a "mega-expert" - the agency itself),
and if the evidence on the record to support the agency's about-face is
so pale by comparison that no reasonable person seeking to advance
the agency's mission would have made such a decision, then the rescission must fail as arbitrary and capricious.
This test differs from the court's approach in two significant respects. First, it eschews as irrelevant any evidence of postenactment
congressional reaction to the agency's prior regulatory course. Second,
it remains faithful to the arbitrary and capricious standard because it
does not raise the evidential standard that the record must meet.
This second assertion requires elaboration. The proposed test
bears a suspicious resemblance to review under a different section of
the APA - section 706(2)(E)"' - which applies by its own terms to
81. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)(1976). Although both the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and capricious test are considered ultimately deferential to the agency, the latter is
generally considered the less stringent of the two. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 705 (1980) (Marshall J., dissenting) (substantial evidence standard "represents a legislative judgment that regulatory action should be subject to review
more stringent than the traditional 'arbitrary and capricious' standard for informal rulemaking"); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (substantial evidence test
affords "a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious'
test"); Verkuil, supra note 42, at 212 (arbitrary and capricious test is normally less stringent
than the substantial evidence test).
Nevertheless, some confusion with respect to the difference between the two standards is evident. See, e.g., Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066, 1072 n.6 (7th Cir.
1981)("It may be that the difference in review standards is primarily semantic."); Bunny
Bear, Inc. v. Pederson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard, but describing it as "a standard of review that may differ little, if at all, from the
standard normally used in substantial evidence review"); Associated Industries of New York
State, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (the distinction may be
largely semantic and the two standards "tend to converge"). See also K. DAViS, supra note
42, § 2900-1, at 520 ("Surprisingly, the answer to the question whether the two tests differ
has been in doubt for several decades and still is.").
The State Farm court appears to follow what commentators have described as a
recent trend of the judiciary to assume a more active role in reviewing the substance of
agency decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Berendt & Kendall,
Administrative Law: JudicialReview- Refections on the ProperRelationshipBetween Courts
andAgencies, 58 CH.[-] KENT L. REV. 215, 216 (1982) ("[Rlecently the courts have exhibited an inclination to assume a more active rule in reviewing the substance of agency decisions."); Pederson, FormalRecords and InformalRulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 48-49 (1975)
("[Tihe invitation to make a searching and careful inquiry into the facts also has been enthusiastically accepted" by the circuit courts. The result of the decision in Overton Park "has
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formal rulemaking conducted under Sections 556 and 557, not informal
rulemaking under section 553 as in State Farm. Section 706(2)(E), as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,8 2 requires formal agency decisions to be
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, 83 i.e., the
reviewing court looks at both the evidence supporting the agency action
and any contrary evidence presented on the record. By reviewing informal rulemaking on the record as a whole, this proposal at first
glance seems to be at odds with the statute. Closer inspection, however,
reveals that the proposed test elaborates, rather than abrogates, section
706(2)(A).
Congress has not set limits on how a court is to conduct its "arbitrary and capricious" inquiry under section 706(2)(A), except that it
instructs courts reviewing under any of the standards set forth in Section 706(2) "[to] review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a
...
84 Although informal agency rulemaking is not conducted
party.
"on the record" as is formal rulemaking, cases involving review of informal rulemaking have held that the court should make an examination of whatever record is available.85 As the District of Columbia
86
Circuit observed in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
although this approach extends judicial review to the entire administrative record, it does not raise the standard that the evidence must meet
to the level of "substantial evidence." 8 In other words, the court looks
at more evidence, but does not look harder at that evidence.
Thus, the proposed test does not impose section 706(2)(E) review
on informal rulemaking, but merely provides meaning to the vague
terms "arbitrary and capricious" in light of the unique characteristics
been to transform the arbitrary and capricious standard into something very close to substantial evidence review.").
82. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
83. Id. at 485.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(1976).
85. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) ("In applying that standard [arbitrary and capricious], the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record
already in existence .. ");Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419 (197 l)(the "'whole record' compiled by the agency" is the "basis for review required by
§ 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act"). See also Wright, Commentary: Rulemaking
andJudicialReview, 30 AD. L. REv. 461, 464 (1978) ("[Ilf courts are going to make a searching and careful review of the facts in an informal rulemaking proceeding, they will need a
proper record.").
86. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
87. Id. at 37-38 (finding that although the court was not required to decide whether the
agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence, it still must determine whether the
cumulative effect of all the evidence presented a rational basis for the promulgated
regulation).
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of a challenge to an agency about-face. Review should extend to all the
evidence on the record, including the agency's prior findings and conclusions. According great weight to the agency's previous findings
merely recognizes agency expertise in its own field.
F. Application of Proposed Test to Rescission of
Mod#Fed Standard208
The value of this test, like any other, is seen in its application. In
State Farm, the court applying this test would have determined
whether NHTSA's rescission of Modified Standard 208 was at all reasonable in light of the facts on the entire record. This in essence is what
the court did, but the court's approach obscures the validity of its
result.
After comparing the agency's findings and conclusions supporting
Modified Standard 208 with those supporting its rescission, the court in
88
State Farm concluded that the agency's action was unreasonable.
The proposed test would not compel a different result. Rather, it would
force the court to face its responsibility for making this crucial determination, rather than implying that subsequent congressional posturing
somehow justifies and in a sense requires the result (either because that
heightens the level of scrutiny on review or because it is itself evidence
that the agency's action is ultra vires).
Additionally, the proposed test assists the court's decision-making
by clarifying the issue. In a case like State Farm, the question is not
whether some plausible reason can be found for the agency's action.
The agency offered several explanations for its decision, none of which
seem wholly irrational in the abstract. The proposed test, however, recognizes that the rationality of actions, like that of words, must be evaluated in context. Because the action in question is the agency's
abandonment of a prior course, the agency's findings and conclusions
supporting that course, and the extent to which it furthered the
agency's purpose, provide the context for judging the rationality of the
change.
Determining which factors should inform the court's analysis is
not the end of the inquiry. The next question is how these factors
should be weighed. Rather than asking if the abandonment of the
standard advances the cause of highway safety in any conceivable way,
the court should ask whether the discrepancy between the case in the
record for retaining Modified Standard 208 and that for abandoning it
is so wide that no reasonable person, seeking to advance motor vehicle
88. 680 F.2d at 230.
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657

safety, would choose to abandon it under the circumstances existing at
the time the agency made its decision.
Under its articulation of the proper standard, the court found "not
one iota of evidence" to support NHTSA's conclusion that Modified
Standard 208 was inadequate.8 9 Based on its examination of the record, the court determined that NHTSA had not presented any statistical data or logical argument suggesting why even detachable passive
seatbelts would not lead to safety benefits exceeding their relatively
small costs." Also, the court found NHTSA's discussion of possible
amendments to Modified Standard 208 "wholly inadequate" because
the agency had summarily ruled out several alternatives to rescission
that the court termed reasonable and obvious. 9 '

The difficulty with the court's analysis is that the court's conclusion that NHTSA presented no evidence to support its position is not at
all clear from the record. NHTSA did present reasons to support its
rescission, even if they were shallow and speculative when compared
with the evidence in the record supporting passive restraints. The correct application of the arbitrary and capricious standard for cases of
agency rescission would have recognized that NHTSA did present a
minimum amount of reasons for its decision, because review under this
test would have compared those reasons with the data in the record for
retaining the standard. Under this test NHTSA's rescission could
properly have been found to be irrational, because a reasonable person,
viewing NHTSA's reasons in the context of its previous findings supporting passive restraints, would not have rescinded the rule were his
true intention to advance motor vehicle safety.
A more immediate problem with the opinion is that the Supreme
Court may reverse State Farm on certiorari. If the Supreme Court interprets the Court of Appeal's test as a question of whether any plausible reason can be found to support rescission, it may conclude that the
Court of Appeals' decision that NHTSA had presented "no evidence"
was incorrect - and label the decision as a substitution of judgment.
But under the proposed test, the Supreme Court could balance the rea89. Id. at 231.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 230. The court found his case analogous to cases in which promulgated regulations were set aside because an agency failed to consider obvious alternatives. See, e.g.,
Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1069 (10th Cir. 1975) (reversing summary judgment for the
government on whether a regulation was arbitrary where the agency had failed to consider
anticompetitive factors); Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 485 F.2d 1018, 1027-30 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (reversing an order extending multilateral air carrier rates because the agency had
considered the only alternative to be open rates, and thus ignored bilateral negotiations and
the agency's suspension powers).
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sons supporting rescission with the data in the record supporting retention. In this way, the Supreme Court could correctly uphold the
validity of the Court of Appeals' decision, while accommodating the
requirements of the APA.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

The State Farm decision's impact on future review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is difficult to predict. If courts can
effectively isolate and apply the basic test suggested by State Farm, the
decision may help to add clarity to judicial review, particularly where
the rescission of agency action is questioned. If, on the other hand,
courts attempt to follow State Farm's problematic articulation of its
approach, this case may simply add to the confusion in the field. More
immediately, the court's approach may result in the reversal of its decision if the Supreme Court takes the view that some evidence can be
found in the record to support the rescission.
In any event, the judiciary must determine the validity of agency
action on its own, rather than turning to postenactment expressions of
opinion in Congress. Meanwhile, the future of passive restraints, and
in a sense that of highway safety, remains unclear.

